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Family (Proper) ty
Richard H. Chused

pays remarkably little attention to the ideal of a
marital community. Afraid of the gendered contours of nineteenth century status
law, contemporary marriage and divorce law
has become largely contractual. Aspects of
nineteenth century marriage which might
prove beneficial, especially to women, have
been discarded in the rush to adopt a vision of
marriage as an easily terminable relationship
between two autonomous souls. In this essay I
search for a new status vision of marriage that
recovers non-gendered features of traditional
family (proper)ty law of value to our present
culture..

J

AMILY (PROPER)TY LAW

I. OLD STORIES OF DEPENDENCY
There is widespread agreement among historians that prop!!rty ownership was a defining
feature of citizenship in the early decades of
the republic. We all know that property
ownership was used to limit access to the bal-

lot in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. While the suffrage limitations arose
in part out of a crass effort by the wealthy to
control access to the corridors of power, they
also reflected some important understandings
about the nature of governance, the capacity of
individuals to act responsibly, the nature of
families, and the role of women.
In a famous letter written to James Sullivan
in 1776 as he was attending sessions of the
Continental Congress, John Adams rhetorically asked, "Whence arises the right of the
majority to govern, and the obligation of the
minority to obey? From necessity, you will say,
because there can be no other rule. But why
exclude women?" His answer was telling, and
central to even our modern debates over the
meaning of family (proper)ty. Adams continued:
You will say, because their delicacy renders
them unfit for practice and experience in the
great businesses of life, and the hardy enterprise of war, as well as the arduous cares of
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state. Besides, their attention is so much engaged with the necessary nurture of their children, that nature has made them fittest for
domestic cares . ... True. But will not these reasons apply to others? Is it not equally true, that
men in general, in every society, who are
wholly destitute of property, are also too little
acquainted with public affairs to form a right
judgment, and too dependent upon other men
to have a will of their own? If this is a fact, if
yo.u give to every man who has no property, a
vote, will you not make a fine encouraging provision for corruption, by your fundamental
law? Such is the frailty of the human heart,
that very few men who have no property, have
any judgment of their own. T hey talk and vote
as some man of property, who has attached
their minds to his interest, directs them.

For Adams, property ownership meant · a
great deal more than wealth. Those of means
were also independent political, economic and
social actors. Their wealth meant they were
capable of acting in the best interests of both
themselves and the larger society. This view
was widely shared among those in the founding generations intelligentsia. Left wing politicos took the position that property should be
distributed broadly among th~ male population in order to enlarge the class of electors.
Those on the right were much more interested
in protecting their own economic standing.
But few quarreled with the underlying nexus
between property ownership and the capacity
to participate in the exercise of power.
Men of the founding decades could, of
course, have taken the position that property
should be distributed to women as well as
men. Their failure to consider such a possibility makes the circular quality of their property
based definition of citizenship quite palpable.
Men governed not only the polity, but also the
family. Women were dependent because they
had to rely on men. And they couldn't have
property because they were dependent. But
regardless of the circles of thought at play, the
cultural linking of property ownership and independence established a perspective of enor-
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mous and continuing importance. For if
women were economically dependent upon
men, then there was no need to 'give" them
more than a relationship (such as marriage)
that would meet their survival needs and
affirm their dependency. But if they became
independent, then, perhaps, men needed to
'give" women nothing at all. This dichotomy
left little room for a family (proper)ty law of
intimate relationships born of mutual interde·
pendence rather than economic dependence.
One either relied upon another person and es·
chewed the responsibilities of citizenship, or
became independent and self-reliant.
While notions of dependency changed
some over the ensuing generations, the basic
dichotomy established by Adams' rhetoric
remained quite influential. The tight links
between property, civic responsibility and suf·
frage gradually loosened over the course of the
nineteenth century, but those with property
were still thought of as more capable of inde·
pendent action. By the middle of the nine·
teenth century, wage earners came to be seen as
capable of exercising independent thought and
therefore of voting. For a short time after the
Civil War, freed slaves were thought capable of
contracting for their labor and therefore of ex·
ercising suffrage. But both working men and
the freed slaves eventually got hung up on the
same sort of dilemma that faced women. If you
were truly independent citizens, there was no
need to ask the government or anyone else in a
position of authority for economic assistance.
Unions, for example, were surely not necessary
for independent wage earners; nor were pro·
tective labor laws. And African Americans, af·
ter a brief post-Civil War window of political
opportunity, were placed below womens pedestal, deemed incapable of political action be·
cause they were dependent souls and
dependent because they were thought inher·
ently incapable of political action.
While the worldview of Adams and others
of his generation encompassed a tight fit be·
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tween property ownership, independence,
thoughtful exercise of civic responsibility, control of families and political participation, it
also nurtured two sorts of understandings
about shared goals, one among men, and the
other between men and women. Those men
With property, at least to some extent, would
work together to protect their common interests. Though the constitutional framework
was designed to reduce the likelihood that any
particular interest group would dominate governmental decision making, there was still a
widely held assumption that the civic responsibility accompanying ownership of property
and the right to exercise political and familial
authority would further a commm~, male
enterprise.
Marriage was also a pivotal common enterprise. While middle and upper class women
were dependent and therefore incapable of independent participation in the government or
economy, they had important political and social roles. Politically they took charge of civic
education, preparing boy children for participation in the body politic and girl children to
tnarry and educate their children. Socially
they were the intimate partners of men. As the
nineteenth ce~tury passed, and many men
Went off to work outside the home, middle
and upper class women came to serve additional social functions - taking care of the kids
and maintaining a household. Though defined
in a seriously imbalanced way, the dependency
of women involved an exchange of economic
support in return for their unpaid work in the
home and the legitimization of an intimate
relationship.
Without the help of women at home, middle and upper class men could not have
Worked in the burgeoning commercial and industrial economy that grew on these shores in
the last century. There was a cultural mythology, if not an economic reality, that married
Women were guaranteed economic security
and cultural respect in return for their accep-
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tance of dependent roles. Part of that economic security and cultural respect was buried
in alimony rules, which provided access to
funds after divorce to women who "behaved"
over the course of a long marriage with
moneyed ;gentlemen." As the centrality of this
dependency arrangement to American culture
declined in this century, so too did the idea alimony was due to women who fulfilled their
marital obligations in traditional ways.
Altering this structure of dependency relationships between married men and women
has been a slow and often painful process.
Beginning about one -hundred and sixty years
ago with the adoption of the first married
womens property acts, women gradually obtained the same legal rights to ownership of
property as men. Wage ownership of a limited
sort arrived in most jurisdictions after the
Civil War. Women obtained suffrage after
World War I. Marital property rules emerged
with divorce reform during the last twenty-five
years.
While claims by radical women for rights to
property ownership and control were certainly
heard during each era of reform, legislators
usually acted for quite conservative and traditional reasons. Radical women often made
claims for rights with rhetoric of autonomy, in
essence accepting the independent/dependent
dichotomy established by John Adams and his
peers during the founding decades of the republic. Such radical claims rarely carried the
day. Married women's property acts arrived
not as a recognition of the right of wives to
own and control property and therefore to
become independent economic and political
actors, but as debtor protection devices to allow 'p roperty held by married women to escape
the clutches of husbandly creditors. Increasing
family stability was the goal, not wifely independence. Wage statutes adopted after the
Civil War accepted the right of women to sue
for their wages, but did so in recognition of the
need of many women to enter the work force to
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support their families. And the statutes did little to alter the right of husbands to control the
family accounts after their wives' wages were
brought home. These statues, like the married
women's property acts, were thought to solidify the home economy, not recognize the independent status of women outside the family.
Even suffrage, that touchstone of early republican notions of civic responsibility, was granted
with an understanding that womens higher
moral antennae could control the excesses of
men, especially drinking men, thereby preserving the sanctity of the home.
Despite the conservative political rhetoric
surrounding each burst of reform, many
women actually used the changes to enlarge
their own realms of economic and, eventually,
political power. Though change arrived amid
traditional talk about dependent women serving the needs of their families by holding property, earning wages and voting for temperance,
it created openings for women to lay claim to
spheres of independent economic and political
action. Women owned more property in 1900
than in 1800; certain sorts of employment
opportunities, including limited access to the
legal profession, began to open after the Civil
War; women began to appear as writers, educators, athletes, legislators, judges, and doctors.
These events did not go unnoticed by pre-New
Deal conservatives on the Supreme Court. In a
remarkable opinion full of puffing about the
new found independence of women created by
law reform and the arrival of suffrage, the
Court, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, struck
down minimum wage laws for women. They
theorized that women were just as capable of
independently agreeing to contracts for their
labor as their male peers in Lochner v. New York
and that minimum wage laws must therefore
fall as a violation of freedom of contract. The
case is a perfect example of how women's claim
for independence was used to refuse them
benefits previously granted under traditional
theories rooted in riotions of dependency.
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This background is crucial to understanding the contemporary debate about the meaning and proper scope of marital property law.
Though women are frequently dependent on
their husbands in ways much like their sisters
a century ago, the widespread claims for marital autonomy in modern culture have reduced,
if not eliminated, the sway of nineteenth century visions of marriage. Indeed, the old vision
of marriage is now viewed as so thoroughly
discredited by its ideal of female dependency
that many insist it may not be used as a solid
basis for thoughtful analysis. We have even
tossed out the old labels, calling alimony spousal support and reviling the word "status" as a
wholly inappropriate label for the state of
marriage. As marital autonomy has risen, the
ability to rely upon marriage as a source of
economic, social and cultural security has
eroded.
It is time to think anew about the values
and meanings of nineteenth century marriage.
I suggest that the nineteenth century vision of
marriage should not be completely discarded.
While the harshly gendered quality of traditional marital property rules and the jarring
dependence of married women in the last century is now unacceptable, three of traditional
marriage's basic components - the expectation
of marital longevity, the idea of an exchange of
valuable assets, and the importance of intimacy - must be retained if marriage is to have
meaning and stable environments for children
are to flourish.

II. NEW STORIES OF
IN(DEPENDENCY)

Treating people as economically independent
after they divorce does ·not always mesh with
the reality of dependence that continues to ex·
ist in many marriages. One day it may come to
pass that women do not expend parJ of their
economic potential on their husbaqds and
families. But at least for now, it is clear that
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tnany more wives than husbands do not work, is more like that accompanying analysis of
Work fewer hours, postpone their careers or business deals than family arrangements.
tnake other decisions which lower their long There is little partnership or property talk
term income earning potential. There is still a that links people together in ways that
Web of inter-dependency (perhaps not quite so connote longevity, economic exchange and inone-sided as a century ago) that makes both timacy. Marital and community property
tnarriage and divorce a much more serious schemes al~ow parties to sign pre-nuptial coneconomic step for women than for men, even tracts that alter or destroy expectations of
tnaking the unwarranted assumption that the sharing during or after marriage. Those not
culture of work no lo~ger discriminates signing contracts may retain the separate
against women. To the extent that we refuse to property they owned before marriage by
Use these ongoing indicia of marital reliance as declining to share it with their spouses. And
a basis for allocating resources, we exacerbate divorce law calls for dividing the capital acthe impoverishment of women, and not sur- count of a !'Ilarriage at divorce, leaving the ·
prisingly, of the children they are likely to spouses largely independent of one another afkeep.
.
ter the divorce is complete.
The language of partnership and commuIn the future, it may be that gender will become an unimportant sign ofdependence in nity is therefore quite different from the notnarriage. Men may sometimes be as depen- tion of marital partnership that was used a
dent upon women as women now are upon century ago. That old and discredited partnertnen. Many marriages may not be economi- ship of dependency involved connotations of
cally unbalanced. Each partner may rely upon marital longevity, economic exchanges and obtheir mate in a variety of ways that are impos- ligations extending beyond the marriage that
sible to untangle. The lessening of genders are now seriously contested, if not reviled.
significance, however, should not lead us to ig- Putting aside the issue of children, marriage is
nore the reality that even in a gender-neutral now thought of as a relationship between two
family law world, interdependencies will autonomous persons and divorce as a clean
always develop between partners in intimate break rather than a gradual dissolution of a
relationships. Qur tendency to describe mar- community. Alimony is a road to indepenriage as a "union" of two autonomous actors dence rather than an indicia of long term enand divorce as a claim for independence and a twined intimacy. Modern marital and
clean break, undermines our willingness to community property law therefore legitimates
rely on interconnections between .spouses. claims of independence as marriage begins,
Our refusal to take seriously the en.twined in- endures and ends, rather than affirming the
timacy of marital relationships also makes it marital community as a basis for discussing
easy to ignore new forms of reliance emerging the nature of intimacy, interdependence and
family. As far as property law is concerned,
between unmarried cohabitants.
·
Marital property law largely ignores both marriage is a financial arrangement pure and
the continuing presence of (often gendered) simple, not an important cultural institution.
dependencies analogous to those of a century Adams' vision of independent actors has
ago, and the importance of the entwined inti- moved from the world of politics to the still
lllacy that always exists in families that func- gendered realm of the family.
The courts most often confront marriage
tion well. Though contemporary marital
when
it ends. Without thinking about why
Property law often invokes words like
"partnership" or "community," the discussion parties marry or why they divorce, judges are
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asked to wind up the financial affairs of a broken family. They draw a sharp line between
the capital account of a marriage, representing
the accumulations of the community about to
be terminated, and the future income earning
potential of the spouses. This division flies in
the face of much that was once traditional
about marriage. Women were dependent
upon their husbands' income streams during
marriage, and, most importantly for our purposes, husbands relied upon their wives' home
labor to make their careers possible. Divorce
was unusual. There was therefore legitimacy
to the claim made by married women that
they should be able to rely upon their husbands' income stream. Even after divorce, alimony was sometimes awarded in recognition
of the right of women to rely upon their mates'
stream of income during their adult lives.
After all, wives had made that income stream
possible. As acceptance of the idea that
women make men's income possible has
waned, so has our willingness to reassign future income from a wealthier ex-spouse to a
less wealthy ex-spouse. Claims of independence and the clean break associated with divorce now overwhelm any thought that the
entwined intimacy of marriage should have
economic consequences or that the presence
of marital economic dependency by members
of either gender justifies the need for an
ongoing financial relationship between exspouses.
The notions that marriage is a contract
between autonomous individuals and that
divorce is a clean break requiring the termination of economic connections between
spouses has made marriage a secondary social
institution. Oxymcronic claims of"marital autonomy" and judicial affirmations of the clean
break syndrome have rendered marriage less
interesting, attractive, and important. If one
can contract around its primary property constraints, why take it seriously? If it can be
easily ended, why begin it? I( it has no prop-
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erty connotations that bind people together in
special ways, why respect it? Integral to the
discredited nineteenth century marriage was
the notion that entry into the marital state was
a big step, a very big step indeed. It was a life
change of major import. In the process of rejecting old status concepts of marriage we have
discarded the cultural expectations that made
the ·institution important. We have thrown
away the baby with the bath water. We have
not only cut the links between inte.r(dependency) and marriage, but also the interconnections between the contours of divorce law and
social conceptions about the importance of
entry into marriage. We can no longer afford
to treat these two inquiries - the law of marriage and the law of divorce - as disconnected
enterprises.
All ·of tnis makes quite questionable the
bright lines we presently tend to draw at divorce between separate and marital or community property, and between future income
and marital capital. It also undercuts the validity of the old dichotomy we tend to draw between dependent spouses and independent,
unmarried, divorced people, as well as the
newer dichotomy between married and unmarried couples. These issues all involve aspects of the same questions. To what extent
should the existence of economic interdependence and of entwined intimacy that is so
much a part of marriage be used as a basis for
meshing the financial affairs of intimate couples? Should the property connections that exist between spouses or other intimate couples
have life after the relationships end? If our theory of partnership or community as a basis for
marriage means anything, why should it be
waivable by contract and terminable at the
drop of a divorce hat? Why not think of marriage, divorce and the property relationships
they entail as part of a process of changing the
lives of two people, much as we now-think of
both birth and death as gradual events that require rules to change over time as events
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unfold. And why should unmarried people
who have relationships that are indistinguishable from married couples be treated any
differently?
Thinking about marriage and divorce. as a
process that occurs over time would dramatically alter our present understanding of many
rnarital property cases now commonly used in
first year property courses in law schools and
bandied about in the literature of the practicing family law bar. Rather than posing questions about the division of capital and income,
they become inquiries into the appropriate
Ways to entangle and then disentangle people
in a relationship. The graduate degree as property cases that so dominate discussion of the
lines to be drawn between marital capital and
future income are actually symbolic of much
larger questions. They are not about investrnent, capital and income in a particular
Project so much as they are about the appropriate ways to entangle people in marriage and
disentangle them after divorce. That more
general inquiry means that any source of past,
Present or future income, not just that produced by one spouse's investment in the graduate 4egree of another, should become a
subject of inquiry in the law of marriage and
divorce. In sh<m, there is nothing special
about a degree. What is important is not the
degree but the search for a basis for allocating
the potential economic value - past, present
and future - of those in a marital partnership.
Indeed, it may, in the modern sense, be civically responsible to consider ways to forge
links between married people, rather than to
affirm their quick access to independence.

III. STATUS AND MARITAL
PROPERTY

llroperty thinkers, schooled on economic theories and principles of rational acting, reliant
Upon autonomy as the backbone of their intellectual culture, unconcerned about the way the
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legal culture of marital property has helped
create the clean break, and totally unaware of
the possibility that the cultural qualities of
marriage might change if the property rules at
divorce shifted, don't like to think about the
way property law and status law interact. It
would be useful if everyone who writes about
or teaches property taught family law for a few
years. The romantic idea of marriage as something more than a sum of its two parts, if
taken with just a smidgen of seriousness,
makes our present laws of marital property
woefully inadequate. And the need to talk
about children quickly reduces the relevance
of autonomy, ration~ acting and independence as driving forces for legal norms.
What would it mean for family (prop~r )ty
law if we took seriously the central nongendered aspects of nineteenth century marriage - the expectation of marital longevity,
the exchange of assets, and the value of
entwined intimacy? First, fault divorce should
not be re-instituted. S~cond, the rules of
marriage should be altered so that many more
intimate relationships are treated as marital.
Family formation and marriage, now thought
of separately, ought to be treated as closely related events. Third, the law of marriage and
the law of divorce should not be thought of as
separate inquiries. As a result, the economic
interdependence of married people ought to
be significantly enlarged by eliminating the
concept of separate property, doing away with
the differences between marital and community property regimes, and requiring postmarital sharing of income after divorce for a
significant period of time. Fourth, children
ought to be considered as economic parties to
a marriage, entitled at divorce to shares of the
marit_al or community property along with
their parents. In combination these steps
would dramatically increase the number of intimate settings in which marriage would occur
while significantly increasing the economic
consequences of marriage. Over the course of
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time, the result would be to persuade people
to more carefully and maturely consider the
initiation, mainte~ance and termination of
intimate relationships.
At first glance you might assume that reinvigorating portions of a nineteenth century vision of marriage would require the repeal of
no-fault divorce. That is wrong. Fault divorce
law was heavily laden with currents of religious thought from English traditions and designed to enforce the dependent/independent
dichotomy of the last century. Recognition of
a need in present day society for family stability does not mean that it should be sought in
the same ways that were used a century ago.
Indeed, the main thesis of this essay is that
family (proper)ty law may be structured to
foster such stability without returning to the
gendered dependent/independent dichotomy
of the past.
Furthermore, divorce law is a terribly inefficient way to deal with marital instability.
The fault divorce structure was an after-thefact system designed to punish and deter marital wrongdoing by refusing to allow parties to
sever their family ties. The sheer perversity of
using continuation of a broken marriage as a
device to punish misbehavior created unfairness and generated enormous disrespect for
legal institutions. It led to false pleading,
feigned cases, migratory divorce, and nasty litigation. Society would be much better served
by creating incentives for appropriate behavior
from the day marriages begin rather than punishing mal~factors after the fact. Though the
horrors of tH~ fault divorce system, together
with strong customs constraining divorce,
probably did 'rrieah that many nineteenth century couples attempted to carefully select their
mates and 'acted ·with care before divorcing,
similar dioughtfulness can be encouraged
without returning to perverse divorce principles. Lohgevity of marriage may be encouraged by dramatically increasing the number of
relationships we label as marital, requiring
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substantial exchanges of wealth between parties upon marriage, holding people to economic obligations after divorce, and
introducing the idea that children are part of
the economic community of marriage.
The law of marriage ought to be changed to
pronounce many more people married than it
does. today. The idea is to make the establishment of an intimate relationship much closer
to a decision to marry than at present. If the
legal consequences attached to the initiation of
intimacy were significant and broad in scope,
people would be more likely to exercise some
care in initiating such a relationship. In addition to continuing to validate standard consensual marriages, marriage should be deemed
to occur automatically whenever a child is
born to a couple and whenever an intimate relationship lasts for more than two years with·
out the birth of a child. The goal is to make
sure that the entwined economic and emo·
tional expectations of relationships are always
treated as legally important. Two years is an
arbitrary construct. If you prefer one year,
that's fine. (This is not an essay on sexual ori·
entation. I do not care about the gender of the
parties coupling up. Nor is this an essay about
new birthing technology. For purposes of this
essay, I also do not care about how a child is
created. And finally, this is not an essay about
defining parent. Though I usually prefer to
think in terms of psychological parenting in
settings involving new reproductive techniques, that conclusion is not central to the
themes of this essay.) You could think of this
proposal as a new form of 'common law"
marriage.
In addition to dramatically increasing the
number of relationships that we call marital,
the economic consequences of marriage must
be substantially increased. The concept of sep·
arate property ought be abolished. Al! prop·
erty belonging to persons on the date they
marry, regardless of its source, should be
treated as marital or community property,
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subject to division at divorce, unless it is
bound by the constraints of a prior divorce decree. We should rid ourselves of the widely accepted rules that property owned prior to
marriage or received during marriage by way
?f gift or inheritance is separate property.
Such a change would dramatically increase the
financial stakes of marriage. Combined with
the new 'common law" marriage rules, people
With money would be compelled to carefully
consider the consequences of having a child or
initiating and maintaining a long-term relationship. Those without money would also be
effected, though in different ways. To whatever degree the significant changes in marriage
law discussed here would alter general cultural
understandings about the nature of intimacy,
all social groups would eventually be
influenced.
In order for this system to have the intended effect, ante-nuptial contracts and other
devices used to place significant limitations on
the sharing of marital assets must be abolished. Increasing the economic consequences
of divorce as recommended here would make
ante-nuptial contracts even more attractive to
the well-off. The need to alter cultural understandings about•the meaning and seriousness
of marriage, however, suggests that persons
should not be allowed to avoid the consequences of marriage by protecting themselves
from the economic consequences of divorce.
The present trend to think of marriage as contractual, along with the clean break syndrome
now governing operation of the divorce system, means that the economically less well off
spouse (usually a woman) has little leverage at
any stage of a marital relationship. That outcome reduces the meaning of marriage as an
interdependent partnership and legitimates an
Unequal balance of power in marriage. Second
marriages ought to be completely subject to
the economic allocations made after a prior
divorce.
Similarly, post-divorce mcome streams,
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now excluded from consideration at divorce
except when payment of spousal support is ordered, also should be treated as marital or
community property for a substantial period
of time after the divorce. Income splitting between the tnarital partners should continue
for one year for each two years of marriage.
(Children, as the second paragraph below argues, also should be included in the sharing,
though on a different time frame.) This proposal, like the proposal to declare two-year
intimate relationships as marital, is arbitrary.
If you prefer a different time structure, I
would not be strongly opposed.
The recommendations to rid ourselves of
the concept of separate property, ban antenuptial contracts, and institute serious postmarital income sharing require a substantial
restructuring of marital property law. Their
adoption would undermine any reason, assuming there is one, to maintain both common law and community property regimes.
The most important area of difference between the two systems arises at death. With
some exceptions, disposition at death follows ·
title in common law property states, while
community property is split between the
spouses at the death of one. This difference
should disappear if serious marital sharing, including mandatory non-waivable sharing of
the estates of married people, is instituted. If
sharing becomes the norm, the two regimes
would, for all practical purposes, become one.
Finally, children should be treated as economic parties to the marital community.
Upon divorce they should be entitled to a proportionate share of both the marital economic
community and the parents' future income
streams until they reach the age of 2 2, or if students, complete college. The goal is to integrate children into the legal and cultural
concept of a family until .they are capable of
supporting themselves. Integrating children
into the marital community would also remove the need to draft ante-nuptial contracts
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to protect the children of first marriages when
their parents remarry. The present structure,
which considers children as entitled to support, but not as equal interdependent partners
in the economic community of marriage, is
symptomatic of our present family (proper)ty
law malaise. Though the recent arrival of child
support guidelines is a significant improvement over prior practice, children are still conceptualized as individuals entitled to money,
not as integral parts of a family entitled to a
full share of the marital economic community.
There is no reason to continue along that
path.
In sum, the recommendations outlined
here create a new system of marriage that dramatically increases the proportion of intimate
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relationships deemed marital and significantly
enlarges the economic entanglements of marriage partners. They demonstrate the potential for both reshaping marital communities
without recourse to the gendered assumptions
of nineteenth century family (proper)ty l~w
and creating strong incentives for carefully
considering the initiation of intimate relationships. In the long run, society would be better
off if we were all asked to think of marriage as
a significant event designed to create stable environments for adults and children. We can no
longer afford to countenance childbirth as a
largely inconsequential family (proper)ty law
event and marriage as a contractual scheme
with few if any mandatory, long term consequences. O i:_r grandchildren deserve better.
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